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Reagan Oral Histories Examine Howard Baker's February 27, 1987 Entry into the White HouseIn November 1986, a story appeared in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Shirra claiming that the U.S. was selling arms to Iran. Within weeks, President Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese publicly admitted that arms had indeed been sold to Iran and the proceeds illegally diverted to support anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua. The scandal provoked a series of congressional and independent counsel investigations into the Administration's actions, and nearly led to the collapse of the Reagan presidency. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan was pilloried by both supporters and opponents of the Administration for failing to prevent the operation and protect the President. On February 27, 1987, Regan was replaced by former Senator Howard Baker. Baker had a distinguished career in the United States Senate dating all the way back to 1967, including four years as Senate Majority Leader (1981-1985). He also had presidential aspirations of his own, challenging Reagan for the Republican nomination in 1980. Some in the Administration worried that such an accomplished political figure would have difficulty serving as Chief of Staff. Despite these concerns, Baker's reputation for integrity and his well honed Washington political skills helped the administration survive its greatest crisis. Below is a selection of excerpts from our Ronald Reagan Oral History Project interviews on Baker's entry into the White House. Full transcripts can be found here. Otis Bowen (Secretary of Health and Human Services): I think he was a Godsend to Reagan at that time. Young: In what sense did you feel that? Bowen: Giving him better advice, I think, on Iran-Contra—things he should say or not say, and do. I don't know what those specific things would be, but the White House personnel seemed—what little I was around them after that—seemed a little more at ease, and not cantankerous. A.B. Culvahouse (White House Counsel): Howard was really determined. He had three priorities. He looked at me and said, "Our first priority is to represent the President and to get him through Iran-Contra—if he deserves to get through it." Then he looked at me very pointedly and said, "You don't want to be the first White House counsel to have his client convicted in an impeachment trial." Then he said, "Then we're going to get an arms agreement with the Soviet Union, because President Reagan told me that was one of his priorities"—which to me didn't sound like someone who was distracted and off his game—"and we're going to elect a Republican President in '88." Those were Baker's three priorities, and I never knew another one. James Kuhn (Personal Aide to the President): But then in came Howard Baker. (put that deleted quote back in) The President needed to formally ask Howard Baker to do it. Even though it was conveyed, "What about Howard Baker? Would he be acceptable?" and Reagan said yes, you've still got to ask him. Even though Baker agreed to do it with Deaver, the formal question has to come from the President. Well, as Bush had worked everything out with Regan to leave on Monday, we were meeting with Howard Baker early in the afternoon—and [Paul] Laxalt was involved, too. We had like a 1:30 meeting up in the residence. We took the President out of the Oval Office, didn't want to do it there, we didn't want Howard coming to the Oval Office, did it in the residence. Brought him in the southeast gate, which was the least monitored gate by the press. It sometimes wasn't monitored at all. Laxalt rode in with him in a White House car. I was in the diplomatic reception room there at the south entrance. The President was upstairs, and Laxalt comes, just charging out of the car like a colt that just broke out of the barn, like this is a very good day for us. There came Howard, kind of just dragging his feet behind. I knew Baker and he knew me, and he said, "Oh Jim, what am I doing, what am I doing?" I said, "Come on, you're doing this because you believe in this President and he needs you. You're coming with us and you're doing the right thing, Howard." He went up, they met, he asked him to do it, the deal was done. Stuart Spencer (Campaign Manager): Howard went about it in a very systematic, lawyer-like way, trying to find out what really happened. I don't think he's ever told the world the whole truth of his findings. He'll probably write a book and tell them some day. He's a very classy guy, and he understood his own strengths and weaknesses. He knew he was a Senator. He wasn't a day-to-day nuts and bolts organizer. He brought Duberstein along. Ken had to do those things while Howard did the big things. The Reagans liked Howard very much and— Young: How was he selected? Do you know how they chose Baker? Spencer: I think Laxalt was the key guy. They bounced names around. Paul was the one who brought up Howard's name. When you bring up a name like Howard, you run it by everybody. Everybody says fine. They're not going to be, but I'd be very surprised if anybody spoke up and said, "I don't think he's qualified." The reaction would probably be like mine, "Hey, if you can get him—I don't believe it—to come and do this job." Robert Tuttle (Director of Presidential Personnel): He wanted to be President, and for him to take that job at a time when it was low for the President—he's one of my real heroes. If you remember, after he came in, well, there was still Iran-Contra, but it became a much more positive White House. I have great respect for Howard Baker. . . . I just admired him so much for taking this job when he thought he probably should be down the hall. He was very loyal to the President. He was a wonderful man. It was a dark time, and Howard Baker got us going again. I think that was a great service to the country. |
