The modern presidency is increasingly defined by empty seats filled with acting officials. Each president can make around 4,000 political appointments, more than 1,200 of which require confirmation by the Senate. In only 20 years, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation has nearly doubled during a president’s first 2 years, from 80 days for George W. Bush’s nominees to 145 days for nominees under President Joseph Biden.¹

Of course, many nominees fare far worse than that: Dilawar Syed waited 827 days before being confirmed as the most recent deputy administrator for the Small Business Administration. Some positions remain vacant for years, across administrations and parties. Politics drives the persistence of some vacancies—playing a role in immigration-related vacancies, for example—but other factors explain long-standing absences in land management, emergency management, aviation safety, and tax leadership.  

Do these vacancies matter? In many cases, career officials possess years of relevant experience that prepare them well to act in political leadership positions; and when less senior political appointees are called to step up temporarily, they feel the incentive to achieve results for the president. At the same time, we hear time and again from government employees that impermanent and constantly changing leadership negatively impacts morale and long-term planning.  

We hear time and again from government employees that impermanent and constantly changing leadership negatively impacts morale and long-term planning.

Acting officials—even if they are seasoned and highly regarded individuals—often lack the perceived authority that accompanies Senate confirmation. Many acting officials are asked to perform multiple jobs at the same time, dividing their attention and increasing their responsibilities. The use of temporary officials also can complicate and even invite legal challenges to government action.²

Recent presidents have learned to anticipate vacancies and plan around them in their personnel strategy. The Trump administration became known for creative interpretations of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, but Presidents Obama and Biden confronted the same problem. According to Ted Kaufman, executive director of the Biden-Harris transition, President Biden made a record number of 1,136 political appointments on his first day in office.³ This was possible because their transition created separate personnel planning groups for appointments and nominations.⁴ Their structure reflected awareness of a difficult reality: they needed to nominate people for Senate-confirmed positions as quickly as possible to maximize time for the Senate’s action, but they also needed senior, experienced appointees in place to fill vacant positions awaiting confirmation, where permitted.

Recent presidents have learned to anticipate vacancies and plan around them in their personnel strategy. 

Not only must presidents-elect contort themselves around a failing system, but the system does not work even for the Senate itself, which is forced to spend an increasing proportion of its valuable time voting on nominations. Max Stier recently published our analysis finding that procedural votes, cloture votes to end debate, and direct votes on presidential nominations made up nearly 55 percent of all recorded Senate votes during former President Donald Trump’s first two years in office and 59 percent during President Biden’s first two years.⁵

Not only must presidents-elect contort themselves around a failing system, but the system does not work even for the Senate itself, which is forced to spend an increasing proportion of its valuable time voting on nominations.

Pause to consider: should such votes constitute nearly 60 percent of the total taken by what might be the most important deliberative body in the world? By comparison, during George W. Bush’s presidency, those votes were just 14 percent of the total, and only 11 percent during Barack Obama’s presidency.

Even while the Senate is spending more time voting on nominations, it has been able to confirm fewer nominees. In the first two years, the Trump presidency saw 620 nominees confirmed, and Biden saw 793, while Bush and Obama saw 957 and 881 nominees confirmed, respectively.⁶ In short, the Senate confirmation process does not work for new presidents, for attracting talented people to government positions, or for the Senate itself. In the attempt to hire personnel to enact their priorities, new presidents’ teams work around the broken process—and presidents’ use of these strategies may further erode interbranch cooperation.

The Senate confirmation process does not work for new presidents, for attracting talented people to government positions, or for the Senate.

If we want to reverse that trend, then it is urgent to turn to practical steps now that can increase the rate of confirmations. The simplest strategy would be to reduce the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation, which grew from 779 to 1,237 between 1960 and 2016—a 59 percent increase.⁷ The Senate values its leverage over these positions, and the nominees themselves value the honor that Senate confirmation bestows. But when presidents fill these positions with acting officials to avoid a broken process, the Senate cannot exercise its advice and consent authority, nor can anyone benefit from the authority of being confirmed.

The simplest strategy would be to reduce the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation.

To reduce the number of positions requiring confirmation, the Senate can start by examining positions with long-standing vacancies, layers of confirmed oversight above them, and boards and commissions, which constitute 300 of the positions requiring confirmation and often receive the least attention. 

The Senate should also revisit the “privileged nominations” process it created in 2011 to allow some positions that typically are not controversial to bypass committee consideration unless any senator objects. Our analysis showed that confirmations for these positions not only are taking longer today than before the privileged calendar was created, but these positions now take even longer than others.⁸ Congress could convert more of these positions to presidential or agency-controlled appointments not requiring Senate confirmation, or it could create an expedited floor procedure to allow nominees not referred to committees to be considered en bloc. 

To reduce the number of positions requiring confirmation, the Senate can start by examining positions with long-standing vacancies, layers of confirmed oversight above them, and boards and commissions.

The Senate can also reassert its constitutional authority to provide advice and consent on executive branch nominations by clarifying the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. That act is not specific about who performs the duties of the agency head when that position is vacant and the act’s time limit on an acting official is reached. It could clarify that the vacancies law applies when an official is fired, prevent agency schemes to reshuffle succession orders to circumvent the law’s rules, prohibit officials from being “dual-hatted” in Senate-confirmed positions, or mandate timely reporting on vacancies and acting officials.  

For their part, presidents can do more to offer transparency into vacancies and acting officials, including implementing the new requirement to create a real-time, online “Plum Book.” 

An online resource, regularly updated and easily searchable, would bring increased transparency and accountability to the federal government and let the American people know who is making decisions that affect them, as a political appointee or a senior career official. It also would provide valuable information to individuals interested in serving in a political appointment.⁹ Fewer Senate-confirmed positions and a faster process would result in a more positive experience for nominees themselves, who currently put their lives on hold for months. Targeting Senate confirmation toward those positions that are most important and realistic to confirm would place the Senate in a better position to exert its constitutional duty to advise and consent.

Finally, such reforms would increase federal agency performance, especially in their ability to take on long-term challenges on the management agenda, to meet customer needs, and to implement a president’s priorities. Competence breeds trust, and trust breeds collaboration—all of which is urgent to increase for our government and for the people it serves. 

Endnotes