Neither Jeff Daniels nor J.K. Simmons, both of whom star in the new film The Brink of War, has ever visited the Miller Center. But the Center’s oral history program archive includes a treasure-trove of first-hand accounts of the subject of their new docudrama: President Ronald Reagan’s historic arms control meeting in Reykjavik with Soviet president Mikhael Gorbachev. Anybody interested in knowing how well Hollywood’s fictional account tracks with the actual realities of that time will find these interviews indispensable, including sessions with two figures central to the film’s account: Secretary of State George Shultz and arms control director Kenneth Adelman.

Here are a few relevant highlights from the interviews in the Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, with special thanks to our former colleagues Steve Knott and Jeff Chidester for their fine work in leading these interviews.

Secretary of State George Shultz: I had a little session with Gorbachev once after he was out of office. He visited me at Stanford. We sat in the backyard and I said to him, “When you entered office, and when I entered, the Cold War was about as cold as it got, and when we left office it was over. So what do you think was the turning point?” And he didn’t hesitate one second. He said, “Reykjavik.” I said, “Why do you say that?” He said, “For the first time, the real leaders got together and really talked about the important subjects.” Then he said, “What do you think was the turning point?” I said, “I think the turning point was when we deployed Pershing missiles in Germany and you had to face up to the fact that the alliance had cohesion and strength.” He didn’t agree with that.

He didn’t hesitate one second. He said, “Reykjavik.” I said, “Why do you say that?” He said, “For the first time, the real leaders got together and really talked about the important subjects.” 

Ed Rowney, arms control negotiator: I was quite nervous because Reagan was talking to Gorbachev one-on-one about getting rid of all nuclear weapons. I wasn’t sure that safeguards were in place. At Reykjavik we had an all-night meeting. The Soviets had come ready to deal. They had put a new man in charge of their negotiating team but six of their regular members were not there. There were six new members. Only one old member was there, Viktor Karpov, my old counterpart from the START days, but he was overshadowed by Marshal [Sergei] Akhromeyev, the new leader. Lo and behold, there was quite a bit of progress made at the all-night meeting…

We had a meeting with Reagan at the Hofdi House there in Reykjavik early in the morning before we met again with the Soviets. I remember the quarters were very cramped. The bathroom was very small. Shultz and [Defense secretary Caspar] Weinberger and someone else were standing in front of Reagan; [assistant Defense secretary] Richard Perle, Ken Adelman, and I were standing in the bathtub. Reagan walked in and said, “I’ll take the throne.” So he went up and sat on the toilet.

Although we were talking about INF, I tried desperately to get the discussion around to whether or not we give up all the nuclear weapons. I was leery of what might be going on. Richard Perle, Adelman, and I pled with Reagan not to make any deal on going to go to zero. We said there is no way can assure verification. Shultz and [arms negotiator Paul] Nitze were either silent or not backing us. There was an obvious split.

Reagan walked in and said, “I’ll take the throne.” So he went up and sat on the toilet.

The meeting Saturday morning was inconclusive and so we went to Saturday afternoon and at this point, the ABM Treaty came up. Gorbachev became very annoyed when ABM came up. He slammed his book shut and walked out. Most everyone was crestfallen; however I was delighted because at least it saved the one thing I was worried about and that was possibly giving up all nuclear weapons. It was the one time my hero had not let me know where he stood.

Arms Control director Kenneth Adelman: Reykjavik was, I think, Reagan’s finest moment. When we were upstairs, we negotiated from 8 o’clock at night to 6:20 the next morning, and I remember being in the little bubble at Reykjavik, briefing Reagan and saying, “Mr. President, there has been more progress in the last night, in one night, than we had in seven years since Geneva.” Then we went into overtime. That afternoon, we were on the second floor of Reykjavik and Reagan and Gorbachev were on the first floor. Then he kept going up a few times and we revised our position one time. Then Reagan was getting tired of it all because we were supposed to stop at noon. He comes up the last time and says, “This is going to be it, try one more time, but we’re not going to do any more. Nancy really is expecting me home for dinner.” … It’s not like he stopped at a bar for a drink on the way home and Nancy had no idea where he was, but he said, “Nancy expects me home for dinner and what am I going to tell her?”

I said, “Mr. President, I’m sure she’ll understand.” Then he took our final position, walked over to the room, and kind of laughed and all of us said, “Good luck.” We knew it was a very big moment for the summit.

Reykjavik was, I think, Reagan’s finest moment. When we were upstairs, we negotiated from 8 o’clock at night to 6:20 the next morning.

Then … all of a sudden … the door opened and he came back, and for ten years I wondered what made him come back…. [T]here’s a big picture window next to the steps and you can see the front lawn of the Hofdi House and therefore you could see the 2,500 journalists on the lawn. So he must have seen that and thought, Oh my God, this is a gigantic moment, because he came back and said, “Let me ask all of you guys something. Are all of you secure that what we’re doing is right for America? Are we getting rushed in because of the tension of the moment, to offer something that wouldn’t be smart?” I thought to myself, God, if you had one question to ask at a moment like that that’s about the best that you could ask.

He went around, kind of one-on-one, George [Shultz], [White House chief of staff] Don Regan, [national security advisor] John Poindexter, Ken, [Defense official] Richard Perle. Within ten minutes the Secret Service came in and said, “It’s over.” 

We went right down the stairs. He went out and Gorbachev was really pissed off at him and he was really pissed off at Gorbachev. Gorbachev walked to the car, which I thought was the wrong way to go. Gorbachev turned to him and said, “Well Ron, I don’t know what else we could have done.” Reagan looked at him and says, “You could have said yes.” You know, kind of John Wayne-like. We were actually with Reagan back in the Ambassador’s house after that. Reagan couldn’t sit still. He was just hopping around, mad as could be.

Gorbachev turned to him and said, “Well Ron, I don’t know what else we could have done.” Reagan looked at him and says, “You could have said yes.” You know, kind of John Wayne-like.

Q: Mad was unusual for him.

Adelman: Oh yes, he was very rarely mad. 

Q: You said that you felt that he had great negotiating skills, command of the issues, and everything. How did the people you were negotiating with see Reagan’s ability to negotiate?

Adelman: All of us knew that he didn’t want to get into technical details and the number of SS-20s; all that became kind of clear because that wasn’t Reagan’s strength. I guess the clearest moment of this was when … Reagan started talking about Gorbachev saying the number of missiles, the number of warheads, he wanted to do this and that and he started giving some numbers and someone said, “Are you talking about warheads, Mr. President?” “Yes, I’m talking about warheads, missiles.” It was quite clear that Reagan did not know whether it was missiles, warheads, it was 3,000, 30,000, or 300, something like that that Gorbachev wanted.

All of us knew that he didn’t want to get into technical details and the number of SS-20s; all that became kind of clear because that wasn’t Reagan’s strength.

So we all were trying to—How do we unwind this? How can we decipher what the hell we’re supposed to do, ask him what Gorbachev has? After about five minutes of this, “Mr. President, did he say this or that?” Reagan didn’t know. Reagan says, “Well, he had a piece of paper he handed me.” So all of us dove for the piece of paper. You know, that was going to be where it was at, and not what Ronald Reagan said. He had no knowledge, no feel, and no interest in whether it was missiles, warheads, SEPs, throw-weights, none of that.

Q: But I mean, did your Soviet counterparts see him as dumb, smart, stubborn?

Adelman: Very stubborn. I think that the idea was he was stubborn, kind of out of it with his ideas on SDI, and that he had little support in the West because of all these protests they saw all the time, and basically that the peace wing was going to win on something like this so there was a temporary problem getting over Reagan. I think this was truer in ’82, in ’83. By the second term, they said, “Holy cow, this is a more formidable force than I thought.”… Reagan’s view was, “We’re legitimate, they’re illegitimate. We have to deal with them on issues because they’re here, but that doesn’t mean that they’re legitimate to deal with.” That attitude really came through and that was a gigantic change. That somehow you’re on the ass-end of history, you’re curtains, and boy, that got them….

So I thought Reykjavik was a big success. A lot of big people in the nuclear business, including some on foreign affairs—[Congressman] Dick Cheney called me up, “What the hell have you guys done?” Sam Nunn couldn’t stand it. Nixon said it was the worst summit in world history, and all that. But I thought it was an enormous success. I still think that.

I thought Reykjavik was a big success. A lot of big people in the nuclear business, including some on foreign affairs—[Congressman] Dick Cheney called me up, “What the hell have you guys done?”

James Kuhn, Reagan’s personal aide: I’m sure you’ve heard this part that I want to make about Reykjavik, was that so much seemed to be happening so fast there. We got there on a Thursday night. Nancy didn’t go; Mrs. Reagan didn’t go on that trip because Raisa Gorbachev wasn’t supposed to go—and then showed up a couple of days later….

In Iceland, … it was getting to the point where they would eliminate all nuclear weapons eventually and take a step in that direction, but there was the big condition on Reagan giving up Star Wars, as the press referred to it, the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan thought he had a deal but in the end said no, and that’s what broke off the talks so abruptly. I’ll never forget that. We’re getting into Sunday night now, early Sunday evening, it’s dark. There were several times where there were breaks in between where he would come out and … brief the rest of the team. They not only needed to brief, but they needed to get feedback also. Just checking everything, clearing everything. Then going back in and making more progress, breaking again, more progress. Then it all coming to an abrupt end the way it did.

But the point I want to make there—and I know Shultz, he was there, he knows—I’d just never seen Ronald Reagan that way before, had never seen him with such a look. I mean, he looked distraught to me, very upset, extremely, very taken aback, upset, borderline distraught. Gorbachev was kind of like, So be it. You could tell, just to me you could tell who really wanted this more than the other one. It was like Gorbachev thought, Well, we can live with the world the way it is. Reagan wanted to end that and wasn’t able to pull that off there.

I’d just never seen Ronald Reagan that way before, had never seen him with such a look. I mean, he looked distraught to me, very upset, extremely, very taken aback, upset, borderline distraught. Gorbachev was kind of like, So be it. You could tell, just to me you could tell who really wanted this more than the other one.

Q: Was that as down as you’ve ever seen him?

Kuhn: Yes, without question. Never—the only other time I saw him kind of down, but not nearly that down, was when Nancy went in to have her breast surgery for breast cancer….

But this was different. In my mind he was really a distraught man there, in a sense, because he wanted it so badly. I think he felt two things. I think for the most part felt that that might have been the only opportunity to ever do this…. That that was the end, that maybe they wouldn’t get together again after that. And that he had missed an opportunity. That maybe, it was certain—well, not maybe, he wasn’t certain that he had done the right thing by saying that we had to have SDI in return, instead of giving it up in return for eliminating all nuclear missiles. Wow. So we were standing there, Gorbachev’s there. They’re having a little conversation out by the limos and I think Shultz probably told you this or you read press accounts, but Gorbachev said something to the effect that, I’m sorry this didn’t work out. Reagan’s response was, “Well, you could have said yes.”

We didn’t know … Where are we going, what are we doing? Are we going right to Air Force One and getting the hell out of here? Are we going to go back to the embassy and meet the embassy staff that we were supposed to? Are we still going to speak to—we had 5,000 Navy and Air Force personnel out at the air base then, it’s still there today, in Reykjavik, Keflavik Naval Air Station—or are we just going to get on the plane and go out? Nobody knew. I said we gotta ask the man. Usually we don’t have to ask him because it’s already worked out ahead of time, but I got in the car with him, we’re sitting there in front of all the press. I said, “Mr. President, I know you’ve got a tremendous amount on your mind, but we don’t know what you want to do now. We don’t know where you want to go.”

In my mind he was really a distraught man there, in a sense, because he wanted it so badly. I think he felt two things. I think for the most part felt that that might have been the only opportunity to ever do this…. That that was the end, that maybe they wouldn’t get together again after that. And that he had missed an opportunity.

I said, “Here are your options. You’re scheduled to go to the embassy, greet staff, speak at the Navy and Air Force personnel at Keflavik, get on the plane and go. You could just go to the plane and go, you could go right out to the Keflavik, speak to the troops, which I think is very important. We can have the embassy staff go out there and you could greet them out there. We could work around it, we could make this adjustment, but you’ve got to tell us what you want to do.” He waited and waited, 10-15 seconds, and he said, “Why don’t we just stay with the schedule and do what we’re supposed to do.”

We got back to the embassy, we were outside, it was warm, and we were going to greet everybody outside. He’s just standing there, just looking with this forlorn look on his face. Everybody stayed away from him. They knew. Everybody could tell he was very upset. I’m just watching him. I thought, God, he’s in this state. I had the sense, is this really going to impact this man for the long term? Is he going to be all right? I just worried because I’d never seen him that way. I knew he’d snap out of it. It was just very unusual, highly unusual. But then when the people came out, he was kind of okay, better, but still way off what he normally was. Then when he gave the speech to the troops out at the Naval air station, it was great. You would have never known there was a problem when he was at the podium.

Then we got on Air Force One and he was back to, “What did I do back there?” And I thought, just leave him alone, leave him alone. And everybody’s asking me, “How is he?” And I said, “I don’t know, just leave him alone.” And we did. About halfway back—it’s like a six and a half hour flight coming back or something—halfway back across the Atlantic he came back and there was the old Ronald Reagan, smiling, bouncing and everything. He said, “I’m okay now. I gave it a lot of thought. I know I made the right decision back there. We couldn’t give up SDI, not for America’s future. I made the right decision. I wasn’t sure, but I know now I did.” No problem, snapped right out of it.

Halfway back across the Atlantic he came back and there was the old Ronald Reagan, smiling, bouncing and everything. He said, “I’m okay now. I gave it a lot of thought. I know I made the right decision back there. We couldn’t give up SDI, not for America’s future. I made the right decision. I wasn’t sure, but I know now I did.”

Peter Hannaford, outside political advisor: I think the climactic moment in the cold war—other people will say it was other times—came … in Reykjavik, where they had—on very short notice, about three months—a summit. At the first meeting they began talking about the zero option, where they would reduce everything down to zero. Ken Adelman, who was on the Reagan staff, told me afterwards that they were getting to that in earnest, and it was moving forward very well. They got to the last meeting on Saturday with the two principals, and Gorbachev said to Reagan, I’ll agree with this plan, provided you put your strategic defense initiative strictly in the laboratory. Put it on the shelf, which wasn’t expected.

That’s when Reagan said to George Shultz, “George, let’s go home.” And they left. Reagan was denounced for not coming to some kind of agreement, anything, you know. Both Democrats and policy analysts and arms control people—and, of course, the amen chorus in the media—were all jumping all over Reagan. But he was right. I think that was the pivotal moment, really was the end game of the whole process, because Gorbachev knew enough about his own economy to know that he couldn’t keep ratcheting up conventional weaponry as he was doing, and do a viable strategic defense initiative to match ours, without his economy collapsing and revolution ensuing. Hence we had glasnost and perestroika.