The Kennedy Withdrawal (Combined)

Over the course of several meetings, from October 2 through October 5, 1963, Kennedy and his advisers debated the merits of a plan to withdraw the bulk of U.S. troops from Vietnam by the end of 1965. Segments from two of those meetings, from the morning and evening of October 2, reveal Kennedy's concerns about that plan and the language with which it was to be explained to the American public.

Date: Oct 02, 1963
Time: 11:00 and 18:05
Participants: John Kennedy and Senior Civilian and Military Advisers
Conversation Number: 114/A49

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(President Kennedy): Do you think this thousand reduction can really...

(Robert McNamara): Yes, sir. We-

(President Kennedy): Is that going to be an assumption that it's going well, but if it doesn't go well- (unclear)

(Robert McNamara): No. No, sir. One of the major premises-two major premises we have. First, we believe we can complete the military campaign in the first three corps in '64 and the fourth corps in '65. But secondly, if it extends beyond that period we believe we can train the Vietnamese to take over the essential functions and withdraw the bulk of our forces. And this thousand is in conjunction with that and I have a list of the units here that are represented by that thousand.

(President Kennedy): Bob, have they-

(McGeorge Bundy): What's the point of doing it?

(Robert McNamara): We need a way to get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when they're not needed, I think is wasteful and it complicates both their problems and ours.

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(McGeorge Bundy): The question that occurs to me is whether we want to get publicly pinned to a date... like 6a.

(Robert McNamara): Well, that goes back to paragraph two, Mac.

(McGeorge Bundy): Yes, it does. It's...

(Maxwell Taylor): Well, it's something we debated very strongly.

(Robert McNamara): Yeah.

(Maxwell Taylor): And I think it is a major question. I will just say this: that we talked to 174 officers, Vietnamese and U.S., and in the case of the U.S., I always asked the question, "When can you finish this job, in the sense that you will reduce this insurgency to little more than sporadic incidents?"

(Maxwell Taylor) Inevitably, except for the Delta, they would say, "'64 would be ample time." I realize that's not necessarily... I assume there's no major new factors entering (unclear). I realize that's...

(President Kennedy): Well, let's say it anyway. Then '65, if it doesn't work out we'll get a new date...

(Maxwell Taylor): '65 is another.

(Robert McNamara): I think, Mr. President, we must have a means of disengaging from this area. We must show our country that means.

(edit)

(President Kennedy): My only reservation about it is that it commits us to a kind of a... if the war doesn't continue to go well, it'll look like we were overly optimistic, and I don't- I'm not sure we- I'd like to know what benefit we get out of at this time announcing a thousand.

(Robert McNamara): Mr. President, we have the thousand split by units, so that if the war doesn't go well, we can say these thousand would not have influenced the course of action.

(President Kennedy): And the advantage of having-

(Robert McNamara): And the advantage of taking them out is that we can say to the Congress, the people, that we do have a plan for reducing the exposure of U.S. combat personnel to the guerrilla actions in South Vietnam- actions that the people of South Vietnam should gradually develop a capability to suppress themselves. And I think this will be of great value to us in meeting the very strong views of Fulbright and others that we're bogged down in Asia and will be there for decades.