Margaret Thatcher was known to quip to her advisers, “Don’t tell me what. I know what. Tell me how.” This remark captures the subject of this book: refining the “how” of the White House. It’s a topic that few books have addressed. Political philosophers have for centuries pondered why government exists. Still more political scientists have written on what policies a president or other public officials should institute while in office. And there is a seemingly insatiable appetite for memoirs that cover who was “in the room.”

My contention is that there needs to be equal attention paid to the operational effectiveness of the institutions of government. The reality is that if an organization can’t deliver an effective “how,” it’s unlikely to get much “what” done, and therefore will fail in its “why.”

Furthermore, academic literature on the presidency has generally examined what presidents did with a descriptive focus. These studies review past action, mostly leaving the reader to surmise the lessons for future action. My approach is to focus on prescriptions for the future—and in particular how a small entity composed of a few thousand people can better run a government that employs several million people, delivers services to some 330 million people, and crafts policies that impact not only them but billions of people around the world. This book is novel in postulating how to create a more effective White House by improving structures and processes, in particular those that are (to a very large extent) inside the president’s control, even as the executive’s overall power is hemmed in by forces inside and outside government.

The reality is that if an organization can’t deliver an effective “how,” it’s unlikely to get much “what” done, and therefore will fail in its “why.”

The best approach to refining the “how” is an interdisciplinary one. Some commentators have approached the topic of how government should work simply by advocating for the application of private sector management techniques. That is not my purpose in this book. My view is that the federal government, including the White House, is simply too different from any private sector organization to superimpose blanket principles of private sector management on it with any expectation of success. It is more appropriate to apply first principles of organization design. There are some concepts that apply to any organization regardless of size or purpose. The challenge is to decide which apply to an entity as unique as the White House, and which don’t.

The federal government, including the White House, is simply too different from any private sector organization to superimpose blanket principles of private sector management on it with any expectation of success. It is more appropriate to apply first principles of organization design.

History brings useful perspectives for analyzing how to improve the “how.” What has been tried before, what has worked well, and what hasn’t? Yet one disadvantage of history as a guide is the small sample size of presidential administrations to survey: in 234 years, there have been forty-six U.S. presidents. That number shrinks to fourteen in the modern age of the presidency (since the creation of the EOP in 1939). Over that time every dimension of the U.S. government has ballooned. Very different individuals, very different size of government, very different circumstances.

Last, there is a psychological level of analysis in this work. Perhaps what is unique about the White House—the pressures of globally significant decisions, the intense media focus on it, the almost limitless power of its resources, and the intrigue of court politics—makes it the world’s most interesting petri dish of human interaction. Static organization charts massively oversimplify the reality of having hundreds of human beings—many of them brilliant, ambitious, and at odds with one another—coexisting in one of the most high-pressure work environments in the world. Solutions require carefully considering the behavioral characteristics of both presidents and the teams around them.

 MEASURING THE DRAPES

 I come to this problem as a former senior aide inside the White House and a participant in three presidential election cycles. In 2012, as the executive director of Mitt Romney’s transition team, I saw it from the perspective of an unsuccessful challenger. In 2016, I was appointed to President Trump’s transition team after his election and helped the candidate move into office. And in 2020—following four years of public service, including as assistant to the president and deputy White House chief of staff—I worked from the inside, preparing initially for a possible second Trump term, and then overseeing efforts to transition to the incoming Biden administration. In my time at the White House, I immersed myself in presidential biographies and since 2021 have reread a number with a new interest in how they dealt with the issues raised here.

My most important takeaway from my experiences and research is that a standard bit of D.C.’s conventional wisdom is wrong: I believe that it is never too soon to “measure the drapes.” This metaphor is widely used to describe an attitude of entitlement on the part of would-be officeholders: they “measure the drapes” of the physical space they seek to inhabit but have not yet earned. The critics’ implication is that, rather than tending to the fundamentals of an election, candidates distract themselves with dreams of authority before the voters have awarded them public office. The idea of “measuring the drapes” has become something of a clichéd synonym for brazen overconfidence. In a feat of presumption, the candidates are thinking too much about what should happen after their election.

I believe that it is never too soon to “measure the drapes.”

However, underpreparing for leadership in the Oval Office is, in my view, a larger blunder for an aspiring president than anticipating what he or she will do once there. I prefer the phrase “measuring the drapes” to mean undertaking the necessary and comprehensive work of preparing to command the most powerful office on earth.

At its heart, this book is a call to assist future presidents by transforming the connotations surrounding the “measuring the drapes” metaphor from pejorative ones to positive ones. Instead of regarding early activity as a sign of arrogance, political insiders and the larger American voting public should see it as a sign of competence. It shows voters a candidate preparing to effectively govern. And that, in governing well, a would-be president can help restore faith in the American system.

Moreover, I recommend that candidates not only do more preparation but that they also highlight it to the voting public and make it part of their election pitch. By showcasing their activities, they will demystify the process of governance, and convince skeptical voters of their ability to not just create a policy platform but deliver on it.

THE FIVE-YEAR PRESIDENCY

In 1939, a government-commissioned panel of experts called the Brownlow Committee found that “the President needs help,” leading to the creation of the Executive Office of the President. I now believe that it is the presidency that needs help. Preparations for governance of the White House have failed to keep pace with the growth and complexity of White House operations. The advent of primaries and the decrease in importance of party conventions have swung the initial selection criteria for presidential candidates toward media and fundraising skills and away from bargaining and managerial ones. Voters in more recent general elections have seldom used as a criterion for selection of a president the skills and experience necessary for managing anything as complex as the White House—let alone the enormous federal government.

The advent of primaries and the decrease in importance of party conventions have swung the initial selection criteria for presidential candidates toward media and fundraising skills and away from bargaining and managerial ones.

And polarization in our politics has made the task even more challenging. At a practical level, candidates need to embrace the potential for significantly shortened transition periods. Whether because of a contested election, the need to involve the Supreme Court in some aspect of the election, or even a need for the House of Representatives to decide the winner (perhaps because of a third-party candidate successful enough that no one candidate gains an electoral college majority), the time between certainty of result and the inauguration of the president could be dramatically reduced. Not only might the management of the transition be impacted but also the national security of the country, which is particularly exposed over this period.

The book introduces a new concept: the Five-Year Presidency. That term clearly does not mean a change to the length of the president’s term of office but, rather, a change in the paradigm of how would-be presidents prepare for the responsibilities of governing in the White House. My proposals accept the reality of the turbulent world that we inhabit and make practical suggestions about how to design, build, and operate a more effective White House and, by extension, the executive branch of the U.S. federal government. Even more specifically, my recommendations entail the addition of what I describe as “Year Zero”—a prepresidency year of consciously designing what will happen at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and how it will be done.

The concepts presented here also apply to a second-term president. The reelection is a perfect opportunity for a major reset to reinvigorate the institution, lock in the actions from the first term, and be even more ambitious for the second. Presidents can use the fourth year of their first term as a new “Year Zero” that plans for a major restructuring and “rebooting” to be rolled out in the postelection period.

It is important to emphasize, given my own roles within one party, that my argument is nonpartisan. With this book, I wish to help future presidents of any party assume the responsibility of running a vast and complicated government.

The book is structured in two parts. The first consists of two chapters that provide a contextual understanding of the presidency by describing the instruments of power available to the president, and an overview of the modern White House. The second part outlines in eight chapters the essence of the Five-Year Presidency, in particular the seven tasks and fifty proposals that should be incorporated into Year One. Knowledgeable observers of presidential politics may wish to go straight to part 2, whereas the general reader is almost sure to find some useful nuggets of background in the first two chapters.

In my work overseeing the White House’s role in the 2020 transition, I saw the strength of our institutions pressure-tested and hold in the wake of a contested election. My goal now is to ensure that future presidents can harness the strength and power of the White House for future good.

In my work overseeing the White House’s role in the 2020 transition, I saw the strength of our institutions pressure-tested and hold in the wake of a contested election.

If successfully executed, the Five-Year Presidency approach can make for a significantly more effective White House, lessen the impact of contested elections, and in so doing, enhance trust in democracy.

Excerpted from Year Zero: The Five-Year Presidency, published by University of Virginia Press ©2024