The Presidency / Featured Content

Stuart Eizenstat, assistant to the president for domestic affairs and policy, reflected on President Jimmy Carter’s relationship to politics and how it influenced his decision-making style.

As assistant to the president for national security affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski worked closely with President Jimmy Carter and knew him personally. Brzezinski reflected on Carter’s sources of inner strength as a president embattled.

Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces emerged as a civil rights issue as the United States responded to the expanding wars in Europe and Asia. This conversation between President Roosevelt and civil rights leaders highlighted the challenge of ending discrimination in the U.S. military. Roosevelt preferred a measured approach to integrating the services—“a thing,” he said, “that we’ve got to work into.”

Following a press conference, President Roosevelt spoke privately about the crisis in the Far East, where the British were about to begin the resupply of Chinese forces resisting Japanese occupation. Distressing reports from Japan suggested that the only way to avoid a regional war would be for the United States to vacate its bases throughout the Pacific—including Pearl Harbor.

President Reagan explained to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher the reasons why the United States had not given her prior notice of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, citing fears of leaks within his own administration. The invasion went off without a hitch, as Reagan explained publicly, with goals of protecting U.S. citizens, facilitating the evacuation of those who wanted to leave the country, and restoring Grenadian democratic institutions.

Martin Anderson, assistant to the president for policy development, reflected on the two sides of President Ronald Reagan's persona. While Reagan seemed to be “soft and fuzzy” on the outside, there was a “steel bar” at his core.

Following his landslide electoral victory in the 1984 U.S. presidential election, President Reagan took a congratulatory phone call from Mexican president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado. Both leaders expressed their desire to strengthen the relationship between Mexico and the United States.

The Reykjavik, Iceland, summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev almost succeeded in eliminating the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The talks foundered, however, on Reagan's unwillingness to forgo the Strategic Defense Initiative. Commenting on what Gorbachev might have done to have saved the agreement, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger relayed Reagan's cheeky answer.

As the first Democrat to assume the Oval Office since the Watergate scandal, President Jimmy Carter described his efforts to reassure the American people about his administration’s honesty and morality. Carter also reflected on the importance of following through on campaign promises—both popular and unpopular—that he believed were right.

President Jimmy Carter was governor of Georgia from 1971 to 1975. When he became president of the United States in 1977, he discovered that governing in Washington, D.C., was different from governing in his home state. In trying to accomplish his administration’s goals, he ran up against legislative and media forces in Washington more powerful than their counterparts in Georgia.

President Jimmy Carter reflected on the underlying feeling of dread that stayed with him throughout the 14-month Iranian hostage crisis. He likened it to a period in the 1950s when he had come home to run the family farm after his father’s death—a hard time filled with constant financial worries.

Speaking with newly elected House minority leader Gerald R. Ford [R-Michigan], President Johnson pledged to consult with Republicans on U.S. foreign policy and to engage them "with dignity and decency." Ford assured Johnson that any disagreements between his party and the administration would remain strictly on the issues.

In advance of the 1964 Summer Olympics, slated to take place in October in Tokyo, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy reached out to President Johnson to suggest measures the United States might take to improve its chances for success. Kennedy feared that “we’re going to do badly there, and that the sports organization in the United States, it’s not what it should be.”

In advance of a meeting with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who had communicated previously with President Johnson about the underperformance of U.S. athletes at the Olympics, Johnson tapped White House counsel Lee C. White to stay on top of the matter so that the American team, in White’s words, could “really concentrate on making a good showing.”

On the day after his daughter Tricia married Edward Cox in a Rose Garden ceremony at the White House, President Nixon learned from Deputy National Security Adviser Alexander M. Haig Jr. that the New York Times had published a trove of materials from a secret Defense Department study of the Vietnam War—what the press would later dub the “Pentagon Papers.” 

Four days after White supremacists bombed a church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four young Black girls, civil rights leaders descended on Washington, D.C., to plead for greater federal protection. With racial violence breaking out in the city, President Kennedy asked that all “keep their nerve” and stressed the need for support among White Americans in the cause of racial justice. 

On 15 September 1963, a bomb exploded in a Black church in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four girls inside. Four days after meeting with civil rights leaders about the ongoing crisis, President Kennedy met with several of the city’s White officials. In pleading with them to accommodate Black grievances, Kennedy both acknowledged and minimized their concerns about the implications of desegregating public accommodations. 

President Johnson phoned Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. [DFL–Minnesota] to express his concern about the senator’s son Robert, who had just been diagnosed with throat cancer. Johnson also discussed the progress of the civil rights bill, for which Humphrey served as floor leader in the Senate. While the two men talked, other U.S. senators made their final statements on the civil rights bill. Almost an hour later, Johnson received word that 73 senators had voted to pass the bill, assuring that Humphrey’s greatest political accomplishment would come at a moment of personal pain. 

President Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy discussed the advantages and disadvantages of signing the civil rights bill before or after the Fourth of July holiday weekend. 

Acting on Attorney General Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy’s warnings about possible violence if the Civil Rights Act were signed before the Fourth of July holiday weekend, President Johnson turned to Roy O. Wilkins, the director of the national NAACP and one of his most frequently consulted Black advisers on civil rights issues, for advice. 

While meeting in the Oval Office with the parents of Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman—two of the three civil rights workers who had gone missing in Mississippi—President Johnson phoned Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to ensure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its director, J. Edgar Hoover, had whatever military assets they needed to aid in the search for the three young men. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover called President Johnson with news that the bodies of the three civil rights workers who had gone missing in Mississippi were not in the car when agents found it earlier that afternoon. The car had been badly burned, but initial observations detected no human remains inside. 

Roughly 36 hours after the disappearance of civil rights workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman in Neshoba County, Mississippi, and following a request from Congress of Racial Equality national director James L. Farmer Jr. for a meeting at the White House, President Johnson vented to counsel Lee C. White about the prospect of granting an audience to Farmer and other aggrieved parties. As for the civil rights workers, White indicated that they probably had been killed.

In conversation with Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, President Johnson ruminated over whether to see the parents of three civil rights workers—James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman—who had gone missing in Mississippi. Johnson asked Katzenbach what he thought had happened to the men, and Katzenbach replied that he thought they had been murdered by the Ku Klux Klan.

Having received word that the bodies of James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman had been discovered in an earthen dam outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi, President Johnson directed White House counsel Lee C. White to call the families of the three civil rights workers to inform them of the development and to let them know that the White House would soon be announcing the news.

Federal Bureau of Investigation assistant director Cartha D. “Deke” DeLoach phoned President Johnson to let him know that agents had discovered three bodies presumed to be those of civil rights workers James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman, who had been missing since mid-June. Although the Bureau had not identified the bodies, found in an earthen dam near Philadelphia, Mississippi, Johnson wanted to notify the families prior to any announcement of the discovery, as “that kind of eases it a little bit.”   

Gerald Ford liked to be briefed through well-researched position papers and person-to-person conversations in which nuances and tradeoffs could be addressed. His style differed greatly from that of President Nixon, as Ford also valued hearing from a wide variety of people. 

White House morale changed dramatically following President Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, one of the many differences staffers noticed when Gerald R. Ford became president. As a longtime member of the House of Representatives, Ford was far more collaborative with West Wing employees than his predecessor.

President Ford and President Nixon had very different personalities and operational styles. As a longtime member of the House of Representatives, Ford was far more collaborative and liked to hear from his advisers before he made a decision.

President Ford had a long career in the House of Representatives prior to becoming president in August 1974. He learned to collaborate and made himself available to a wide range of people during his career in Congress, which informed his leadership style as president.

When Gerald Ford assumed the presidency in August 1974, he inherited a fractious political environment. Divisions increased when President Ford made the choice to pardon former president Nixon in September 1974. According to Ford chief of staff and defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Ford had a solid record regarding national security, the economy, and domestic issues. President Ford was competitive in 1976 against Georgia governor Jimmy Carter and lost the presidential election only by a narrow margin.

Following the imposition of martial law in South Vietnam and the arrival of Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. as the new U.S. ambassador in Saigon, President Kennedy critiqued the American press in Vietnam. He did so after the State Department informed Lodge that the United States might need to withdraw its support for South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm. This exchange with Roger Hilsman Jr. was part of the first high-level meeting JFK had following the dispatch of that message.

After several days of discussion about an impending coup against South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm, Kennedy officials remained divided on whether to support the putsch. While all recognized the challenges of working with Diệm, senior officials, especially those at the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, feared that even a successful coup would hinder the war against the Vietnamese Communists. 

With CIA sources in Saigon reporting that the situation there had reached a “point of no return,” President Kennedy and senior aides discussed their support of a coup to oust South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm. In this excerpt, Kennedy sought to gauge its prospects for success and, depending on its viability, preserve Washington’s freedom of action. 

With a coup against South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm once again in the offing, President Kennedy and senior U.S. officials considered the virtues of supporting it. Among those questioning its wisdom was Attorney General Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy, who thought Washington was discussing the coup with a lack of analytic rigor. 

Meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff chair Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy discussed the agenda for their upcoming mission to South Vietnam. Their trip would include an audience with South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm, who would hear about a U.S. plan for withdrawing American troops. 

This tape captured Secretary of Defense Robert S. “Bob” McNamara speaking with President Kennedy in a moment of optimism about the war in Vietnam. McNamara had just returned from Honolulu, Hawaii, where U.S. military and civilian officials reviewed a plan to phase down U.S. forces in Vietnam from a projected 15,600 soldiers for Fiscal Year 1964 to 1,500 by the end of Fiscal Year 1968. Following the conference, Pentagon spokesman Arthur “Art” Sylvester proclaimed that “the corner has definitely been turned” toward victory. 

Following the imposition of martial law in South Vietnam and the arrival of Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. as the new U.S. ambassador, President Kennedy and senior advisers considered the impact of a coup attempt against South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm. Secretary of State Dean Rusk feared that Diem’s current policies, which most recently included raids on Buddhist pagodas and the declaration of martial law, had put the United States “on the road to disaster.” 

In the wake of the aborted coup against South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm, President Kennedy dispatched a fact-finding team to evaluate the state of the war and political climate in South Vietnam. Reports from the State Department’s Joseph A. Mendenhall and the Pentagon’s Major General Victor H. Krulak reached wildly different conclusions. Kennedy, in turn, asked aides to negotiate their disagreements in private rather than through the press. 

Having failed to generate a consensus appraisal of developments in Vietnam through the dispatch of mid-level officials from the State Department and Pentagon, President Kennedy decided to send the higher profile team of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff chair General Maxwell D. Taylor. Kennedy recognized that the mission would involve delicate diplomacy with both South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm and U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. 

Speaking with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff chair General Maxwell D. Taylor just prior to their departure for Saigon, President Kennedy addressed the prospect of telling South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm of plans to withdraw American troops. While McNamara hoped to begin withdrawal “if the military situation improves,” Kennedy thought it better to leverage Diệm by highlighting the depth and duration of U.S. support.

Three days after learning of the assassinations of South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Nhu—and two days after learning that General Dương Văn “Big” Minh had personally ordered their murders—President Kennedy dictated a memorandum giving his version of events.

President Johnson called FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to notify him of the course decided on now that Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspect in President John F. “Jack” Kennedy's assassination, had been shot and killed by Dallas nightclub owner Jack Ruby. Hoover needed no persuasion about the inadvisability of a presidential commission to investigate Oswald's death. Johnson also indicated his exasperation with an expected editorial in the Washington Post and shrewdly asked for Hoover’s help in countering it. 

Shortly after expressing their condolences to Rose F. Kennedy, mother of the late president John F. “Jack” Kennedy, President and Lady Bird Johnson spoke to Idanell B. “Nellie” Connally, wife of Texas governor John B. Connally. The only other casualty in Dealey Plaza that day, John Connally was one of President Johnson’s closest political associates, having managed Johnson’s 1960 campaign for the presidency.

Some 30 minutes after leaving Dallas, Texas, the site of President John F. “Jack” Kennedy’s assassination hours earlier, President and Lady Bird Johnson placed a telephone call to the Kennedy family compound in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. The Johnsons offered their condolences to Rose F. Kennedy, mother of the late president. Sergeant Joseph Ayres, the steward aboard Air Force One who initially talked with Mrs. Kennedy, would later tell biographer William Manchester that he had to check himself from saying “President” Johnson in this call. But Rose Kennedy used the appellation without hesitation.

Less than 24 hours after the assassination of South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Ngô Đình Nhu, President Kennedy queried senior U.S. officials about how the administration should discuss it publicly. Kennedy sought to describe it as “unfortunate” and expressed concern about its potential impact in Saigon and abroad. 

Speaking with news reporters just prior to the 1940 election, President Roosevelt highlighted several theaters in the expanding global war, “any one of which,” he noted, “might get worse.” In the event they did so, the burden of response lay with his office. He maintained that “the President has to do something about those things,” indicating that the presidency itself was expanding in scope.

Speaking with Senator Herman E. Talmadge [D-Georgia], President Johnson asked his opinion of appointing Georgia native and Phi Beta Kappa member W. Tapley Bennett as U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic. Talmadge assured Johnson that Bennett would steer clear of trouble, but Bennett later invited controversy for urging LBJ to send U.S. combat troops to Santo Domingo in April 1965.

In 1960, John F. "Jack" Kennedy defeated Richard M. "Dick" Nixon in the U.S. presidential election. Two years later, Edmund G. "Pat" Brown beat Nixon once again, this time in the California gubernatorial race. In his concession speech delivered the morning of 7 November 1962, Nixon blamed the press for his defeat and famously declared to reporters: "You don't have Nixon to kick around anymore because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference." Here, Kennedy and Brown discussed their shared opponent. 

After the March on Washington, President Kennedy met with civil rights leaders to explore the opportunities and challenges associated with pending civil rights legislation. He stressed that Republican support would be essential for Congress to pass a bill that addressed jobs, job training, and public accommodations. While several among the group lobbied for a Fair Employment Practices Commission, Kennedy thought its inclusion might sink the bill's chances.

When the White House released this transcript in August 1974, it contradicted President Nixon's claims that he had not interfered with the FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in. Large numbers of congressional Republicans promptly switched from defending Nixon to calling on him to resign or face impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate.

President Nixon asked White House chief of staff H. R. "Bob" Haldeman about the sources and uses of funds connected to the financing of operations in the Watergate scandal. Disbursement of the money out of the Committee to Re-Elect the President was, as Nixon put it, "a very bad place to have it, Bob."

Aware that two of President Nixon's closest aides—Chief of Staff H. R. "Bob" Haldeman and Chief Domestic Adviser John D. Ehrlichman—might be charged with obstruction of justice, White House counsel John W. Dean III, himself at risk of obstruction charges, briefed the President on the growing threat to his administration.

Riding high in the 1972 pre-election polls, President Nixon paused to assess the state of the Watergate cover-up. Telling White House chief of staff H. R. "Bob" Haldeman he was "not that worried about it," Nixon still recognized the need to reward the Watergate burglars with hush money. Those men "took a hell of a risk and they have to be paid. That's all there is to that," Nixon said. 

Fearing that the release of the Pentagon Papers presaged a leak of his own secrets, President Nixon created the Plumbers, a White House investigative unit, to stop that leak and to spring new ones on his perceived enemies. His intent was criminal—to leak grand jury information and to burglarize the Brookings Institution, where Nixon mistakenly believed a safe held classified documents about the Vietnam peace talks that he had maneuvered to thwart before the 1968 election.

Convinced that the leak of the Pentagon Papers foretold a vast conspiracy to leak his own secrets, President Nixon decided to mount a counterconspiracy. He would target his perceived enemies through "a program for leaking out information, for destroying these people in the papers." Nixon's Special Investigations Unit, also known as the Plumbers, would go on to conduct a series of illegal operations, including the break-in at the Watergate complex.

Fearing that a presumed conspiracy would leak his most damaging secrets, President Nixon prepared to launch a real conspiracy of his own. The "team" he proposed would become the Special Investigations Unit, later known as the Plumbers. They would engage in numerous illegal actions on behalf of the President. In this conversation, Nixon discussed options for the team's leadership with Chief of Staff H. R. "Bob" Haldeman.

Attorney General John N. Mitchell had balked when President Nixon revealed that he wanted to leak grand jury information about his perceived enemies. In this conversation with Chief of Staff H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, Nixon expressed the hope that Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst would be more pliable about doing "horrible things."

Seeking to face off against the weakest Democratic candidate in the November 1972 presidential election, President Nixon decided to meddle in the New Hampshire primary. To siphon off votes from front-runner Sen. Edmund S. Muskie [D-Maine], Nixon suggested to White House special counsel Charles W. "Chuck" Colson a secretly financed write-in campaign for Sen. Edward M. "Teddy" Kennedy [D-Massachusetts], who was not a presidential candidate that year. 

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. called President Johnson to inform him that he had chosen Sen. Edmund S. Muskie [D-Maine] to be his running mate in the 1968 presidential election. Humphrey asked if the President would be at the upcoming Democratic National Convention, and Johnson said no. He suggested that if he did attend, he would get in the way and distract attention from Humphrey's presidential nomination.

In this conference call with three 1968 presidential candidates, President Johnson reviewed recent developments on Vietnam and his conditions for imposing a total bombing halt on the North. Hanoi had demanded a cessation of bombing in order for peace talks to move forward; for his part, Johnson needed assurance that the North Vietnamese would refrain from shelling civilians in South Vietnamese cities, respect the Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] between North and South Vietnam, and consent to Saigon's participation in peace talks. Hanoi's move toward acceptance of those conditions had set the stage for a bombing halt—and the emergence of a new dynamic in the U.S. presidential race.

In this conversation, which took place the day after the New York Times began publishing a trove of secret government documents that would come to be known as the Pentagon Papers, President Nixon considered enjoining the Times to cease and desist. In advising the President to pursue an injunction, Attorney General John N. Mitchell erroneously claimed that the U.S. government had previously blocked the publication of materials on the basis of national security.

After learning the previous day that Newsweek magazine was about to identify Daniel J. "Dan" Ellsberg as the source of the Pentagon Papers leak, President Nixon and several White House aides speculated on the role of religion and ethnicity in Ellsberg's decision to commit espionage. Their conversation laid bare a host of prejudicial assumptions as they considered the presence of Jews in their administration, particularly on the staff of the National Security Council headed by Henry A. Kissinger.

Less than a week after the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a blow to the Nixon administration and sanctioned further publication of the Pentagon Papers, President Nixon and senior White House aides discussed the role of race and religion as drivers of espionage. This conversation stands as one of the cruder examples of Nixon's prejudices and his willingness to air them among confidants.

On the eve of Valentine's Day 1973, Julie Nixon Eisenhower convinced her father to take the family out for dinner at Trader Vic's, a California-based chain of Polynesian-themed tiki restaurants. The local Trader Vic's was three blocks north of the White House in the Statler Hilton hotel. That evening, the Nixons and their guests walked the three blocks to the restaurant. The group included President and Mrs. Nixon, Julie and David Eisenhower, and Charles G. "Bebe" Rebozo, a long-time friend of President Nixon's. After the dinner, Nixon quipped to reporters outside, "When you go in there, don't be on a diet."

After alerting President Nixon the previous day to the disclosure in the New York Times of secret government documents on the Vietnam War, Deputy National Security Adviser Alexander M. "Al" Haig Jr. briefed Nixon and Secretary of State William P. "Bill" Rogers on the likely identity of the leaker. The source of that information was Walt W. Rostow, a national security adviser in the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson during the last three years of Johnson's presidency.

Before addressing the nation that evening, President Kennedy informed former president and five-star general Dwight D. Eisenhower of his intention to blockade Cuba. Should the blockade fail to spur the removal of Soviet ballistic missiles, Eisenhower encouraged Kennedy to pursue military action, as he doubted whether the Kremlin would respond with nuclear weapons to a U.S. invasion. 

Reviewing the logic behind the blockade of Cuba, President Kennedy instructed his advisers, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, to remain silent—both now and in the future—on their planning to invade the island. 

Reflecting on the blockade they had imposed that morning, White House officials recognized that it might give Moscow time to operationalize the missiles it had already sent to Cuba. Linking the fates of Berlin and Cuba, President Kennedy speculated on how Soviet moves might lead to hostilities in both locales. 

With President Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev exchanging accusatory letters and U.N. secretary general U Thant floating his own proposal to resolve the missile crisis, White House officials discussed their quarantine of Cuba. Committed to enforcing the blockade, the Kennedy administration weighed the costs of stopping a passenger ship. 

With Moscow having publicly proposed a trade of NATO missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy conferred with senior advisers on how to respond—a major challenge, since the Kremlin had previously offered a private deal to remove its missiles in return only for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. As Kennedy came to realize, most of his advisers opposed the missile swap.

After criticizing President Kennedy’s decision to impose a blockade on Cuba, Air Force chief of staff Curtis E. LeMay told JFK that he faced a serious dilemma. The President assured LeMay it was one they shared. 

Briefing congressional leaders on his intention to blockade Cuba, President Kennedy faced the wrath of several senators opposed to his policy, none more so than Sen. Richard B. “Dick” Russell Jr. [D–Georgia]. Their exchange, which took place just 90 minutes prior to Kennedy’s televised address outlining his decision to blockade, highlights the charged tenor of the meeting. 

During a meeting with his national security team, President Kennedy learned that Moscow had upped its demands for removing Soviet missiles from Cuba. Washington would have to pledge not only to not invade Cuba but also to trade out NATO missiles in Turkey. 

While speaking with Secretary of Defense Robert S. “Bob” McNamara about the controversial appointment of a new chief of police for the District of Columbia, President Johnson expressed outrage about the recent, separate robberies of both McNamara’s daughter and the daughter of a Republican senator. The high levels of crime in the District had been an issue that Republican nominee Barry M. Goldwater Sr. [R–Arizona] had tried to use against Johnson during the recent presidential campaign. The exchange captured the emerging salience of crime as an issue in American politics.

During a long conversation with National Security Adviser McGeorge “Mac” Bundy about the war in Vietnam, President Johnson turned to coverage of the situation by major news outlets and alluded to long-standing, anti-Semitic theories that an organized Jewish cabal controlled the media. Johnson also discussed the appointment of NBC president Robert E. “Bob” Kintner as White House adviser, which served as an attempt at improving his media relations.

Concerned that Senator Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy [D–New York] would criticize his foreign policy during a tour of Latin America, President Johnson turned to former president Dwight D. Eisenhower for help and proposed that Eisenhower’s brother, Milton S. Eisenhower, be dispatched to head off Kennedy’s attacks.

President Johnson received a briefing from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. “Cy” Vance about a proposed operation in which American planes would drop Belgian paratroopers into the Congo to rescue hostages held by rebel forces in the city of Stanleyville. After asking specific questions about the plan and receiving assurance that his national security team supported it, the President authorized the mission.

Speaking with FBI deputy director Cartha D. “Deke” DeLoach, President Johnson expressed his fears about contacts between Communist embassies in Washington and prominent Senate critics of his Vietnam policies. Johnson used the opportunity to criticize former assistant secretary of state for Security and Consular Affairs Abba P. Schwartz, who had resigned his post amid charges that he was being targeted for removal.

National Security Adviser McGeorge “Mac” Bundy discussed with President Johnson the possibility of having Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. ask the President of the Philippines, Diosdado P. Macapagal Sr., to send troops to Vietnam. President Johnson objected strongly to this suggestion, arguing that “I don’t think it’s wise to have [Humphrey] go out [and] make any proposition to anybody about anything.”

As he awaited news of the hostage rescue operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, President Johnson discussed the possible consequences of the operation. Johnson was concerned about the potential reactions of other African nations and Black Americans. National Security Adviser McGeorge “Mac” Bundy assured him that since the airdrop could be justified as a humanitarian action, the backlash would be minimal. Nonetheless, the exchange demonstrated Johnson’s awareness that U.S. support of Belgium risked tying Washington to colonialism in Africa.

Former president Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed annoyance with rumors that he had threatened the use of atomic weapons during the Korean War and had advocated use of such weapons in Vietnam. He reiterated to President Johnson that in the current conflict “I never vary from my stand that this is your responsibility.”

President Johnson consulted with former president Dwight D. Eisenhower about a potential appointment for Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who had disclosed a family tragedy and wanted Johnson to be aware of it. Johnson and Eisenhower discussed the matter and agreed that in this circumstance, professional ability and integrity outweighed family history.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. “Bob” McNamara reported to President Johnson on the outcome of the hostage rescue operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. McNamara noted that the operation had been a success militarily, despite the deaths of numerous hostages. While the operation carried the taint of colonialism, it prevented more hostages from being killed—a development that would have generated, he thought, even more criticism of Washington.

President Johnson and his adviser Abraham “Abe” Fortas weighed the risk of bombing North Vietnam, which might provoke China to intervene on behalf of its Communist ally and perhaps draw Russia into the war.

Dozens of ministers had answered a call to participate in a second Selma march on 9 March 1965, the day before this conversation. That march led to little violence, but later that day White segregationists attacked three White ministers outside a restaurant. One of those clergymen, Unitarian Universalist minister James Reeb of Boston, would die from his wounds on 11 March. Here, Attorney General Nicholas deB. “Nick” Katzenbach explained Reeb’s prognosis to President Johnson and detailed the possibilities for maintaining law and order in the area.

Responding to Special Assistant Doug Cater’s question about how to brief reporters about the pacification program in Vietnam, President Johnson noted Walter Rostow’s recent observation that American efforts at helping the South Vietnamese people risked the appearance of colonization.

Less than two weeks after the events of Bloody Sunday in Selma, Alabama, President Johnson spoke with former Tennessee governor E. Buford Ellington, who served as Johnson’s liaison with Alabama governor George C. Wallace Jr. Wallace had just escalated his confrontation with the federal government in public remarks that diverged from his private comments to the President made only hours earlier, prompting Johnson to describe Wallace as “absolutely treacherous.”

Speaking with Time-Life founder Henry Luce, President Johnson assessed the capabilities and character of General William C. Westmoreland, who headed the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968.

In this conversation with Speaker of the House John W. McCormack [D– Massachusetts], President Johnson explained his veto of a bill that would have given Congress 120 days to review the closure of military bases. Johnson also complained about the irresponsible comments made by the bill’s sponsor, House Armed Services Committee chair L. Mendel Rivers [D– South Carolina], about U.S. policy toward China.

Speaking with Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen [R–Illinois] following the 1964 election, President Johnson appealed to Dirksen’s sense of duty to pursue a bipartisan agenda in the upcoming legislative session. Reviewing results from the campaign, as well as prior examples of working across the aisle, Johnson told Dirksen that the country “never needed you more.”

Making his postelection calls to supporters following his victory in the 1964 election, President Johnson reached out to former president Harry S. Truman. Johnson lauded Truman for several landmark achievements in the late 1940s, the magnitude of which “makes all of us look like pygmies” by contrast. As he would do repeatedly with Truman, as well as with former president Dwight D. Eisenhower, Johnson extended the perks of the office.

Fearful that postelection commentary would fixate on disapproval of Republican presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater Sr. [R–Arizona] rather than on his own popularity, President Johnson enlisted confidant Edwin L. “Eddie” Weisl Sr. in a campaign to redirect attention to an analysis of LBJ’s electoral victory. Johnson asked Weisl to tell publishers that the American public “liked [LBJ], and that he came, and he saw, and he conquered.”

President Johnson and Vice President–elect Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. exchanged pleasantries and congratulations with several senators in this call, including the newly elected Democratic senator from New York, Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy. This conversation between Johnson and Kennedy was one of their most lighthearted and good-natured dialogues recorded on the White House tapes.

In this postelection conversation about legislative strategy, President Johnson conferred with Speaker of the House John W. McCormack [D–Massachusetts] about House Rules Committee chair Howard W. “Judge” Smith [D–Virginia], who had repeatedly blocked legislation from coming to the House floor. Their remedy would be the 21-Day Rule, which allowed the full House to consider a bill if Smith had not granted a rule within three weeks of the relevant committee’s request.

Following the 1964 election, President Johnson discussed the recruitment of personnel and reviewed the job qualification that he prized most with National Security Adviser McGeorge “Mac” Bundy and presidential assistant Bill D. Moyers. For Johnson, the model of an effective adviser was Clark M. Clifford, who Bundy described as “the wisest man in the city.”

When President Johnson announced that he would not select any member of his Cabinet as his vice-presidential running mate for the 1964 election, Attorney General Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy decided to resign and run for a U.S. Senate seat from New York. Here, Johnson discussed Kennedy’s plans with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who admitted, “I just can’t wrap my mind around that kind of ambition.”

Congratulating Bureau of the Budget director Kermit Gordon on generating positive publicity during the last week of the 1964 presidential campaign, President Johnson nevertheless upbraided Gordon for referring to LBJ as “the President” instead of as “President Lyndon Johnson.” Johnson wanted Gordon at all times to invoke the President’s full name, as it was “worth 10 dollars’ television time.”