705–2

Conversation No. 705-2

Date: April 10, 1972
Time: 8:57 am - 9:55 am
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

Vietnam
-Military operations
-Reports from Military Region One
-Tank battle
-Quang Tri
-North Vietnamese losses
-Tanks
-Numbers
-Personnel
-Numbers
-South Vietnamese claims
-North Vietnamese attacks
-Coordination
-Problems
-Reports from US advisors
-Kissinger’s view
-Use of tanks
-Possible difficulties
-George S. Patton
 2

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Performance comparisons
-South Vietnamese artillery
-Success
-South Vietnamese tanks
-Effectiveness
-Region One
-Casualties
-Press reports
-The President's television speech
-Kissinger’s opposition
-Sense of crisis
-Kissinger’s upcoming conversation with H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Military operations
-Region Two
-B-52 strikes
-Status
-Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.’s presence at meeting
-The President’s plan
-Military operations
-Vinh
-Air strikes
-B-52s
-B-52s
-Use in North Vietnam
-1968
-Impact
-Soviets
-The President's speech
-Kissinger’s opposition
-Administration’s proposed show of strength
-Negotiations
-Domestic opinion
-Ground forces
-US policies
-Attrition
-President’s view

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. entered at 9:02 am.

-Military operations
-Weather in Region One
 3

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Concentration of force
-Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. and Gen. John W. Vogt, Jr.
-Region Three
-Saigon
-Air strikes
-Region One
-Timing
-Scope of attacks
-US Air Force [USAF]
-Weather
-B-52s
-Bomb damage assessments
-Expanse in area
-Weather
-Increase in tonnage
-Abrams and Vogt
-Need to concentrate force
-President’s view
-Improvements in strategy
-Compared with Lyndon B. Johnson
-The President’s instructions to Haig
-An loc
-Situation of South Vietnamese division
-Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] defections
-News reports
-New York Times reporter in Paris
-Military operations
-B-52s
-Past use against North Vietnam
-Washington Post and New York Times reports
-South Vietnamese performance
-Ground forces
-North Vietnamese tanks
-Destruction
-Public relations value
-Air strikes
-First division
-Hue
-Destroyers
-Damage and casualties
-Chance of South Vietnamese success
 4

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
-Kissinger's conversation with Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Haig left at 9:09 am.

-Military operations
-Air strikes on Vinh
-Radar
-Accuracy
-Damage reports
-Effectiveness
-North Vietnam’s reaction
-Necessity
-Kissinger’s approval
-Melvin R. Laird and Abrams
-Psychological impact
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Chance of failure
-B-52 strikes
-Air field, truck parts
-Blockade
-Instruction to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
-Establishment
-Hanoi
-Impact on negotiations
-USSR
-Dobrynin
-Conversation with Kissinger
-The President’s view
-Negotiations
-Private talks
-Possible USSR purpose
-The President’s instructions to Kissinger
-Possible settlement
-Advantages to US
-Kissinger’s view
-The President’s upcoming speech
-J. William Fulbright's criticism
-The President's speech
-Problems
-Kissinger’s concern
 5

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Opposition’s criticism
-Hubert H. Humphrey and Edmund S. Muskie
-Anthony Lewis's article in New York Times
-Lewis
-Impact on public opinion
-The President’s view
-Domestic opposition to war
-The President’s trip to Philadelphia
-Timing
-The President's trip to Canada
-Demonstrations
-Press reports
-The President's trip to Philadelphia
-Demonstrations
-Impact on Hanoi
-Kissinger’s opinion
-Demonstrations
-Kissinger’s message to Dobrynin
-US stance
-Compared to Johnson
-News reports
-Alarmism
-Abrams’s interview
-Benefits and potential drawbacks
-Charles G. (“Bebe”) Rebozo’s opinion
-North Vietnamese offensive
-The President's speech
-Success of Vietnamization
-Winston S. Churchill
-Disadvantages
-Sense of crisis
-Compared with Laos operation
-Haldeman's view
-Previous support from Kissigner
-Tchepone
-Public opinion
-People’s Republic of China [PRC] trip
-Polls
-Problems
-Soviet summit
-Impact of US success and failure
 6

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Polls
-Polls
-Soviet arms
-India
-Southeast Asia
-The President's speech
-Soviet role in Vietnam
-Use of latest technological equipment
-Support of South Vietnam
-Morale
-US role
-Air and naval power support
-North Vietnamese success
-Soviet role in Vietnam
-Damage to US credibility
-Encouragement to aggression
-Middle East
-The Americans
-Europe
-Stakes of war
-William L. Safire
-State Department [?]
-Soviet role
-Haig’s previous conversation with the President
-Haig’s view
-W[illiam] Averell Harriman
-Past interpretations
-Henry Cabot lodge
-The President’s previous visits to Vietnam
-Lodge’s previous visits to Vietnam
-Compared to Kissinger
-Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor
-William J. Porter
-Objectives
-PRC
-India-Pakistan War
-William P. Rogers and State Department
-Objectives
-Jordan
-Syria
-The President's analysis
 7

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Kissinger’s agreement
-Signing ceremony for the convention of chemical and biological weapons
[CBW]
-Timing
-The President's remarks
-Kissinger’s view
-The President's speech
-Advantages and disadvantages
-Negotiations
-Domino theory
-Soviet summit
-News reports
-Kissinger’s attendance at gridiron dinner, April 9, 1972
-Possible opinions of the media and politicians
-Victories
-Publicity
-Military Region One
-Stories in the New York Times and Washington Post
-North Vietnamese advances
-Military Region One
-Military Region Three
-An loc
-Quality of ARVN division
-Chance of defeat
-Possible fall
-South Vietnamese strengths
-Abrams’s and Ellsworth F. Bunker's assessments
-Current situation
-Military Region One
-Stabilization
-Counterattack
-Tanks
-Destruction
-Number
-Military Region Two
-Intelligence reports
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-North Vietnamese losses
-Air strikes
-B-3
-Military Region Three
 8

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Reinforcements
-South Vietnamese divisions
-Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu's assessment
-Airborne brigade
-Binh Long
-Bunker’s view
-Military Region Four
-Small unit actions
-Duration of offensive
-Interrogation of POWs
-North Vietnamese losses
-Tanks
-Numbers
-Casualties
-Withdrawals
-Cambodia
-North Vietnamese divisions
-Military Region One
-Reorganization
-Timing of military operations
-Air support
-Counterattacks
Abrams and Bunker
-Reports
-The President's handling of crisis
-US bombing
-US options
-Possible blockade
-The President's speech
-Kissinger’s opposition
-Future public appearances from the President
-Philadelphia
-Kissinger’s trip to Japan
-Cancellation
-Soviet response
-Possible blockade
-USSR
-Kissinger’s conversation with Dobrynin
-Johnson
-US military action
-Timing
 9

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Role in North Vietnam
-Speech
-Diplomacy
-Complexities
-Rhetoric

US-PRC relations
-Compatibility of interests
-Short term interests
-Long term interests
-CBW
-The President's Canadian speech
-Speechwriting
-George S. McGovern

Vietnam
-William F., Jr. and James L. Buckley
-Conversation with Kissinger
-Timing
-James Buckley
-Speechwriting
-Support for the President on bombing
-B-52s
-William Buckley
-Conversation with Kissinger
-Location
-Call to brother
-Talk with Kissinger
-Conservatives
-Support for the President
-End to criticism of administration
-William F. (“Billy”) Graham
-Conversation with Kissinger
-Support for the President
-Call to other supporters
-Attitude towards the war
-Stakes in war
-Election
-The President's speechwriters
-Raymond K. Price, Jr. and Lee W. Huebner
-Safire
 10

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Work with Kissinger
-Phrase, The Guns of April
-[Barbara Tuchman] and Guns of August
-Safire
-Price
-Safire
-Price
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Military situation
-Reaction
-The President’s effort
-Press reports
-Fear of South Vietnamese success
-Possible events on May 1, 1972
-Withdrawals
-An loc
-Quang Tri and Kontum
-The President's speech
-Timing
-Success of Vietnamization and Nixon Doctrine
-Haldeman
-Foreign policy
-Advantages
-American opinion
-Disadvantages
-Possible weakness in Administration’s stance
-Timing
-Impression on North Vietnam
-Press
-Nuclear weapons
-Ronald L. Ziegler
-Haldeman's judgment
-Kissinger's judgment
-Administration hawks
-Weather
-Air strikes
-Military Region One
-Impact
-Concentration of force
-Negotiations
-Possible settlement
 11

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Administrations possible tone
-Kissinger's trip to Japan
-Cancellation
-The President’s schedule
-Haldeman
-Negotiations
-Secret talks
-Timing
-The President’s report
-Negotiations
-Porter
-Public talks
-Role
-Meeting with President
-Porter’s location
-Timing
-Statements
-Edward M. Kennedy, et al.
-Possible Porter statement
-North Vietnamese reply
-US conditions to the North Vietnamese
-Baltimore Sun
-Disclosure of secret talks
-Potential effect
-Porter
-Statement
-US offers
-Timing
-Porter's posture
-Rebozo's assessment
-Resumption of talks
-Timing
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Areas of fighting
-Saigon
-Attacks on US forces
-Blockade
-Losses
-Chances of success
-US air power
-The President’s view
 12

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-US counteractions
-Concentration
-The President's Soviet trip
-North Vietnamese miscalculations
-ARVN weakness
-View of the President
-Harriman, Clark M. Clifford
-[Johnson]
-Rogers and Laird
-Handling of crisis
-Laird
-Toughness
-US statements
-Ziegler
-Press reports
-Robert B. Semple, Jr. report
-Sense of crisis in White House
-White House advisors
-Concern
-Statements to press
-Ziegler
-Max Frankel
-Assistance from Kissinger
-White House advisors
-Semple
-Cambodia and Laos
-Kissinger, Haldeman, Alexander P. Butterfield, Charles W. Colson
-Strength of stance
-Weaknesses
-John D. Ehrlichman
-George P. Shultz
-Price and Patrick J. Buchanan
-Cabinet
-Presidential responsibility
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Lack of support for US policy
-Air strikes
-B-52s
-Hesitancy
-Naval gunfire
-Intensity
 13

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. 10/06)
Conv. No. 705-2 (cont.)


-Manila
-US military
-Responsiveness to demands
-Destroyers and cruisers
-Panama Canal
-Soviets

Kissinger's schedule
-Washington Special Actions Group [WSAG]
-Report to the President

Kissinger left at 9:55 am.