721–11

Conversation No. 721-11

Date: May 8, 1972
Time: 12:13 pm - 1:15 pm
Location: Oval Office

The President met with Henry A. Kissinger.

Vietnam
-Previous National Security Council [NSC] meeting
-Kissinger's evaluation
-William P. Rogers
-Position on blockade
-Kissinger's evaluation
-Blockade discussion
-Melvin R. Laird's position
-Rogers's position
-Support compared with Laird
 8

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-John B. Connally
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
-United Nations [UN]
-Kurt Waldheim
-Security Council meeting
-Significance
-State Department
-Soviet Union
-Significance
-People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Soviet Union view of
resolution
-Delay
-Waldheim
-Blockade
-President's decision
-Timing
-President's schedule
-Richard M. Helms's briefing
-Content
-President's decision
-Possible delay
-Problems
-Leaks
-Duration
-Advantages
-Public position
-Timing of NSC meeting
-24-hour delay
-Advantages
-Duration
-The President’s schedule
-Soviet pressures
-UN resolutions
-Waldheim
-NSC meeting
-Follow-up meeting with Connally
-Location
-H. R. (“Bob”) Haldeman
-Laird
-Laird's position

Haldeman talked with the President between 12:21 and 12:22 pm.
 9

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)


[Conversation No. 721-11A]

[See Conversation No. 24-2]

[End of telephone conversation]

Vietnam
-Blockade
-Costs
-Connally
-Delay
-Soviet pressure
-President's decision
-Discussion

Connally entered at an unknown time after 12:22 pm.

-Laird
-Connally

Connally's schedule

Vietnam
-NSC meeting
-UN
-Waldheim
-Security Council meeting
-Initiative
-State Department, Soviet Union
-Security Council resolution
-Ceasefire
-Rogers's schedule
-Delays
-Blockade
-President's decision
-Possible delay
-Kissinger's reasons
-Advantages
-Public perceptions
-Disadvantages
-Soviet awareness
 10

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-UN meeting
-Waldheim
-Sources
-State Department, Soviet Union
-Reasons
-President's decision
-Delay
-Advantages
-Disadvantages
-Opposition
-Arguments
-Advantages
-Cabinet
-Rogers's position
-Laird's position
-Helms's position
-Briefing
-Support
-Connally
-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
-Gen. George A. Lincoln
-Connally
-Lincoln
-Agnew
-Laird's position
-Rogers's position
-Timing
-Rogers
-Laird
-Opposition
-Connally’s view
-Timing
-Connally's evaluation
-Status quo
-Rogers
-Laird
-Rogers
-Soviet Summit position
-Laird's position
-Disadvantages
-Imports to North Vietnam
-Percentage by sea
 11

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-Air strikes
-Impact on supplies and rail lines
-Rail lines
-Problems with statistics
-Gauges in North Vietnam and PRC
-Impact on imports of Petroleum, oil and lubricants [POL]
-Overland shipments
-Rogers and Laird
-Conversation with Connally
-Rogers
-Soviet Summit concerns
-Kissinger's trip results
-Kissinger’s view
-Laird's concerns
-Costs of blockade
-Rogers's position
-Bombing
-Laird's opinion
-Targets
-Connally's position
-Bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi
-Support for President
-US foreign policy
-Effect of South Vietnam
-Rogers and Laird
-Support
-South Vietnamese collapse
-US position
-Advantages
-Rogers's assessment
-Connally's assessment
-Message of retribution
-Bombing of North Vietnam
-Targets
-Civilians
-Fear of deaths
-US message to aggressors
-Kissinger's assessment
-Consequences of failure
-US troops in South Vietnam
-Speed of possible South Vietnam collapse
-Agnew's theory
 12

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-Laird's theory
-North Vietnamese objectives
-Kissinger's assessment
-Kissinger’s return from Soviet Union
-Camp David
-Provincial capitals
-Army of Republic of Vietnam [ARVN] collapse
-Dangers
-South Vietnam-US fighting
-Coalition government in Saigon
-Prisoners of war [POWs]
-Bargaining chip
-Possible ARVN collapse
-Blockade advantages
-Bargaining chip
-POWs
-Nguyen Van Thieu
-South Vietnamese morale
-Impact
-Laird's assessment
-Kissinger’s view
-Moorer's assessment
-POL supplies
-Overland shipments
-PRC and Soviet Union coordination
-Air strikes
-North Vietnamese reaction
-Kissinger’s view
-North Vietnamese leadership considerations
-Division supplies
-Impact
-North Vietnam logistical system
-Difficulty in changing
-North Vietnamese campaign
-Hue
-South Vietnam response
-North Vietnam method of operation
-Inflexibility
-Reaction of Soviet Union and PRC
-US domestic support
-Soviet reaction
-Pressure on North Vietnam
 13

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-Summit
-Cancellation
-US statement
-Ronald L. Ziegler's release
-Kissinger’s possible briefing
-Rogers's position
-Connally's view
-Announcement of agreements
-North Vietnam offensive
-South Vietnam military situation
-Laird's assessments
-Cambodia, Laos comparisons


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BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3
[National Security]
[Duration: 18s ]


CAMBODIA


END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 3

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-Effect of blockade
-Diplomatic
-On South Vietnam collapse
-On bargaining for POWs
-Military operations
-North Vietnam
-South Vietnam morale
-North Vietnam
-POL supplies
-Air strikes
-Impact
-Utilities
-Communications
 14

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-Latest strikes
-Damage reports
-President's options
-South Vietnam collapse
-US efforts to prevent
-Rogers
-Protests
-Domestic
-Senate
-UN
-PRC and Soviet Union
-President's East-West policies
-Impact
-Press
-American people
-Support for President
-Opposition to war
-American spirit
-Connally’s view
-Possible US withdrawal
-Timing
-Forthcoming election
-Means
-Diplomatic efforts
-North Vietnamese response
-Military efforts
-POWs, troop withdrawal
-Intensity
-Laos, Cambodia
-Necessity
-Support
-Duration
-Time
-Possible US withdrawal
-North Vietnamese offensive
-Duration
-Impact of blockade
-Weather
-Hue
-Future strategy
-Time
-Democratic National Convention
 15

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-Movement of roops
-B-3 front
-Cambodia
-October offensive
-Effect of blockade
-Blockade
-Necessity
-President's speech
-Haldeman
-Time
-Forthcoming briefing for Congressional leaders
-Content
-Notification of Rogers and Laird
-Peace offer
-POW exchange
-Ceasefire
-US withdrawal
-Time
-Hugh Scott
-POWs
-Ceasefire
-US withdrawal
-Trade
-Advantages for North Vietnam
-Rogers's and Laird's notification
-Use of term blockade
-Domestic response
-Soviet response
-Press use
-Mining
-Interception of ships
-Contents
-Mining
-Instructions for US forces
-Interdiction

Connally left at 12:59 pm.

-Drafting
-Kissinger's schedule
-Haldeman
-Notification of Rogers and Laird
 16

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-Kissinger
-Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
-Time
-Rogers
-Soviet Summit
-The President’s view

Haldeman and Manolo Sanchez entered at 1:00 pm.

President's schedule
-Executive Office Building [EOB]

Kissinger's schedule
-Soviet embassy

Sanchez left at an unknown time before 1:02 pm.

Vietnam
-Democrats
-Senate caucus
-Possible meeting with President
-Arrangements
-Clifford P. Case-Frank F. Church amendment
-Michael J. Mansfield's role
-Blockade
-President's speech
-Television time
-Notification
-Cabinet
-NSC
-Andrews
-Time
-Rogers and Laird

Kissinger left at 1:02 pm.

-President's possible meeting with Democratic leaders
-Mansfield
-Time
-Press reports
-NSC meeting
-Democratic leaders
 17

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-J. William Fulbright, John C. Stennis
-Delay in antiwar amendment vote
-Soviet summit
-Hawks' position
-Stennis
-Henry M. (“Scoop”) Jackson's statement
-Ground troops
-Bombing
-Hanoi, Haiphong
-Time
-Need
-President's speech
-Briefing of Senate Democratic leaders
-Time
-Mansfield's call
-Delay in response
-Notification
-Announcement of television time
-Time to release
-Ziegler
-Briefing for Congressional leaders
-Attendees
-Kissinger's opinion
-Allen J. Ellender
-Fulbright
-Mansfield
-The President’s view
-Briefing for committee chairmen
-Rogers
-Blockade
-Chances of success
-Rogers's assessment
-Support for the President
-US military strength
-Options
-Laird's view
-South Vietnam's strengths
-Deterioration
-Rogers's argument compared with Laird’s argument
-Alternatives
-Connally's view
-Need to try
 18

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS STAFF

Tape Subject Log
(rev. Dec-01)
Conv. No. 721-11 (cont.)

-US credibility
-POWs
-US credibility
-Rogers's view
-Compared with Connally’s view
-PRC
-Soviet Union
-Soviet Summit
-President's strengths
-Chance of success
-Outcry
-Rogers's view
-Connally’s view
-Soviet Summit
-Kissinger’s role
-The President’s view
-Laird
-The President’s view
-Opposition to blockade
-President's decision
-Chances of success in Vietnam
-Effect on Summit
-Cancellation
-Probability
-Timing
-Public opinion
-Expectations
-Separability
-Effect of military situation
-Time
-North Vietnam offensive
-President's forthcoming speech
-Arrangements
-Cabinet meeting

The President and Haldeman left at 1:15 pm.