Final Report
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Press Coverage

Former Secretaries of State James A. Baker, III and Warren Christopher, Co-Chairs of the Miller Center's National War Powers Commission, testified on April 28 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Baker and Christopher testified on March 5 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee) about the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 – the statute that the Commission unanimously recommended in its July 2008 report. The statute is designed to replace the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and provide for more meaningful consultation between the president and Congress on matters of war.

Baker and Christopher outlined their findings and their case for the War Powers Consultation Act in a USA Today opinion piece on March 3. "The legislation would set forth a constructive and practical way in which the judgment of the President and Congress can be brought to bear when making the decision to commit our nation to conflict," they wrote. Presidents, Members of Congress, scholars and lawyers have long argued about which branch of government has the power to decide whether the nation goes to war, and meaningful consultation between the branches has not always taken place, they wrote. "Having served in six presidential administrations, we are familiar with these debates. But we also know that if a proper framework is in place, Presidents and Members of the Congress are willing to exchange ideas and do, in fact, consult. Having studied polling data spanning the past 70 years, we know that Americans want such meaningful consultation."

Baker and Christopher continued: "Our proposed Act seeks to deliver on this desire and, in doing so, is markedly different than the flawed 1973 statute. It defines a specific group of leaders in Congress with whom the President must consult before committing the nation to war. It provides this bipartisan Congressional committee with a permanent staff and access to key intelligence data. Of course, the President could delay consultation for three days when faced with an exigent circumstance, such as a need for secrecy or in response a surprise attack on the United States. But after that, the Act it requires the President and congressional leaders to meet regularly throughout any conflict. There are exceptions, such as covert action, which are required by other provisions of the law."

The Miller Center impaneled the National War Powers Commission in February 2007. Over 13 months, this bipartisan commission met seven times, interviewing more than 40 witnesses about the respective war powers of the President and Congress.

"This statute does not attempt to resolve the constitutional questions that have dominated the debate over the war powers, and does not prejudice the president or Congress their right or ability to assert their respective constitutional war powers," said Secretary Baker when the report was released. "What we aim to do with this statute is to create a process that will encourage the two branches to cooperate and consult in a way that is both practical and true to the spirit of the Constitution."

"We have tried to be as specific as possible in this report and in this legislation," said Secretary Christopher. "We have defined the kinds of armed conflict that would be covered by the statute, and have laid out a clear course of action for both the president and Congress that is practical, constructive and deliberative."

The War Powers Consultation Act of 2009:

• Provides that the president shall consult with Congress before deploying U.S. troops into "significant armed conflict" – i.e., combat operations lasting, or expected to last, more than a week.
• Defines the types of hostilities that would or would not be considered "significant armed conflicts."
• Creates a new Joint Congressional Consultation Committee, which includes leaders of both Houses as well as the chair and ranking members of key committees.
• Establishes a permanent bipartisan staff with access to the national security and intelligence information necessary to conduct its work.
• Calls on Congress, to vote up or down on significant armed conflicts within 30 days.

Commission members: Slade Gorton, former U.S. Senator from Washington; Lee H. Hamilton, former U.S. Representative Indiana; Carla A. Hills, former U.S. Trade Representative; John O. Marsh, Jr., former Secretary of the Army; Edwin Meese, III, former U.S. Attorney General; Abner J. Mikva, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; J. Paul Reason, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University; and Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution.

Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Doris Kearns Goodwin served as the Commission's historical advisor. John T. Casteen, III, President of the University of Virginia, and David W. Leebron, President of Rice University, served as ex officio members.

John C. Jeffries, Jr., the Emerson Spies and Arnold H. Leon Professor of Law of the University of Virginia School of Law, and W. Taylor Reveley, III, President and John Stewart Bryan Professor of Jurisprudence at the College of William & Mary, served as Co-Directors of the Commission.

The James A. Baker, III Institute of Public Policy at Rice University, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, Stanford Law School, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the William & Mary School of Law served as partnering institutions.